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PREPARING THE GREEK REVOLUTION IN ODESSA IN THE 1820s:
TASTES, MARKETS AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM 
Evrydiki Sifneos
Abstract: The article highlights the port-city space of Odessa during the first three 
decades of its foundation as an important hub of commercial activity, maritime trade 
and political liberalism in southern Russia. It emphasizes the role of multiple markets 
based on imported and local trade goods and describes the different ethnicities involved 
in foreign trade, focusing on merchants of Greek origin, their participation in the Philiki 
Etaireia and their degree of involvement in its organizational mechanisms. I attempt to 
read the Philiki Etaireia’s development and its influence on the Eastern Question and 
Russian-Ottoman relations in light of the general political fermentation that was taking 
part in the Russian Empire, mainly through the creation of secret societies within the 
Russian army. I believe that the Russian authorities, being involved in the general mobility 
and movement of ideas, influenced by the Western experiences of the Russian military, 
had to deal primarily with major political issues that left aside, at least at a regional level, 
movements of the same character that concerned the Greeks. In this positive political 
climate the “commercial outlook” of the Greek revolutionaries gave them the necessary 
coverage to act and move relatively freely.
Introduction1
Anticipating the opening of the free port and town of Odessa, the British consul, 
James Yeames, wrote to Joseph Planta, the undersecretary of the Department of 
British Foreign Affairs, that after the considerable delay due to preparatory works 
that should have been completed by the town committee and the governor-
1 This article was first presented at the 2013 Convention of the Association for Slavic, 
East-European and Eurasian Studies, held in Boston, MA, 21-24 November 2013, in the 
session “Commercial Revolution in the Northern Black Sea Coast in the 19th Century: 
Markets and Politics” organized by Professor Gelina Harlaftis. Its research has been co‐
financed by the European Union (European Social Fund – ESF) and Greek national funds 
through the Operational Programme “Education and Lifelong Learning” of the National 
Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) – Research Funding Programme: THALES, Investing 
in knowledge society through the European Social Fund. The broader research on Odessa 
and its ethno-religious groups, part of which is the subject of this article, has been primarily 
financed by the School of Historical Studies of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, 
of which I was a member during the period September-December 2012, benefitting from an 
Elizabeth and D. Richardson Dilworth grant. Historiographical note: All studies on Odessa
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general’s severe reprimand to the local authorities, the port was expected to 
open in 1819, and considerable property, mainly of British traders, was ready for 
importation.2 British merchants were mostly used to working with trade support 
policies and needed institutional regulation in order to venture their trading 
capital in foreign countries.3 Their French counterparts had already penetrated 
Odessa’s market after the appointment of the Duc de Richelieu as the city’s 
governor (1803-1814), and as Charles Sicard reiterated they had come to Odessa, 
based on personal esteem and faith in Richelieu’s measures to develop the town’s 
commercial activity and port infrastructure.4 With them came Italians, basically 
from Naples. Odessa had gained a reputation as a newborn port from the moment 
the Neapolitan Joseph de Ribas undertook, as the town’s administrator, the first 
initiative to implement Catherine the Great’s instructions for attracting a larger 
population and immigrants to the town and its suburbs. Before the French and 
the Neapolitans, during the first years of the establishment of the city (1794-
1810), many Greek merchants and seafarers settled, as the lists of the foreign 
magistracy confirm. In 1799, from the 62 individuals who were claiming to have 
permission to register in the town’s merchant guilds, there were 53 Greeks, 5 
Poles, 2 Moldavians, 1 Albanian and 1 Jew.5
in the imperial period cannot ignore the seminal works of Professor Patricia Herlihy. I 
therefore refer to her substantial works as the basis of my study: Odessa: A History, 1794-
1914, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986; “Greek Merchants in Odessa in the 
Nineteenth Century”, in Ihor Sevcenko and Frank E. Sysyn (eds), Eucharisterion: Essays 
Presented to Omeljan Pritsak on his Sixtieth Birthday by his Colleagues and Students, 2 vols, 
Cambridge, MA, 1979, Vol. I, pp. 399-420; “The Greek Community in Odessa, 1861-1917”, 
Journal of Modern Greek Studies VII/2 (1989), pp. 235-251; “Russian Grain and the Port of 
Livorno, 1794-1865”, Journal of European Economic History 5 (1976), pp. 79-80; “Odessa: 
Staple Trade and Urbanization in New Russia”, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, n.s., 
21/2 (1973), pp. 184-195; and Oleg Gubar and P. Herlihy, “The Persuasive Power of the 
Odessa Myth”, Ukrainian Research Institute, Harvard University (accessible online: http://
www.2odessa.com/wiki).
2 Public Record Office, London, Foreign Office, 65/118, letter of the British consul 
James Yeames to Joseph Planta, His Majesty’s undersecretary of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs, 24/2 July 1819.
3 W. Kirchner, “Western Businessmen in Russia: Practices and Problems”, Business 
History Review 38/3 (1964), pp. 315-327.
4 Bibliothèque Victor Cousin, Paris, Fond Richelieu, Notice sur onze années de la vie de 
Richelieu à Odessa par Ch. Sicard, Odessa 1827.
5 Derzhavnyi arkhiv Odes’koi Oblasti [State Archives of Odessa Region; hereafter DAOO], 
Fond 59, opis 1a, delo 156, Report of the foreign magistracy of Odessa to Novorossiiskaia 
Kazennaia Palata, December 1799. All non-Greek merchants petitioned to enter the third 
guild. Two Greeks had sufficient capital to register in the first guild and seven in the second.
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Odessa was not simply a city of many foreigners; it was a city of foreigners. 
The unusual fact that they constituted a substantial majority at the beginnings 
of its foundation, quite literally imported from abroad, consolidated Odessa’s 
reputation as a non-Russian city. Its administrators during the first decades of 
its existence were also foreigners, albeit in the service of the Russian crown: 
the Neopolitan Joseph de Ribas, and the Frenchmen the Duc de Richelieu 
and Count Louis Alexandre Andrault de Langeron. In Odessa the great 
instigator for the implementation of free port status was its governor, the Duc 
de Richelieu. In many letters addressed to Tsar Alexander I, he described the 
experience of foreign free trade sea-ports and explicitly stressed Smyrna’s role 
as a centre of a flourishing transit trade.6 Richelieu’s plan was to detour part of 
Smyrna’s Anatolian trade via Trabzon–Odessa to Brody and Central Europe. 
Although Russia followed protectionist policies, import and export duties on 
Odessa’s port were gradually relaxed beginning in 1810 and formal free port 
status was enforced from 1819 to 1857. Acknowledging the importance of 
merchants in the modernizing process that would lead to the city’s commercial 
boom, Richelieu, as Sicard recounted, was in close contact with them. He knew 
them personally regardless of their nationality, visited their businesses and 
informed himself on their sector of commerce, their expectations and needs.7 
The relationship between the governor and the merchant body was at odds 
with ruling practices, since merchants as a social category (estate – soslovie) 
were not perceived as agents of change in the still-enserfed society.8
Markets in the Newborn Port-city
Markets were the heart of the city’s economic life, places of exchange designed 
by city planners to bring together buyers and sellers. They were regulated 
and overseen by the civic authorities, who allocated the public spaces, type 
of goods and working hours and certified the traders who could sell products 
in each. In order to operate successfully markets needed the entrepreneurial 
skills of merchants and the purchasing capacity of the population. Capital and 
marketing know-how were essential, as was the urban population’s ability to 
acquire material possessions. 
6 Bibliothèque Victor Cousin, Fond Richelieu, Correspondance, Le Duc de Richelieu 
à l’Empereur Alexandre sur la Nouvelle Russie, 1814.
7 Notice sur onze années de la vie de Richelieu.
8 On the estate division of Russian society, see Gregory Freeze, “The Soslovie (Estate) 
Paradigm and Russian Social History”, The American Historical Review 91/1 (February 
1986), pp. 1-36; on the particular problems of Western businessmen in Russia, see Kirchner, 
“Western Businessmen in Russia”.
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Two markets were designed during the first decade the city was under 
construction. The Old Bazaar, in the inner city, specialized in local foodstuffs 
and artisanal artefacts, and the Greek Market, nearer to the port, was devoted 
to imported products. Its Greek merchants were provisioned by sailing vessels 
from the Mediterranean via the Black Sea, while the Old Bazaar received goods 
by cart from the city’s outskirts or the immediate hinterland. Connected by 
a wide avenue with planting in its centre (esplanade), the Alexandrovskii 
Prospect, the two markets were on the same commercial axis that originated 
at the port and ended at Bolshaya Arnaoutskaya (see map 1). Besides the open 
market square, both included the buildings on the four sides of their perimeters 
and associated infrastructure, including warehouses, and inns and taverns that 
served clients and visitors. Dealers in the same trades clustered in streets or 
rows of buildings, in permanent stores or temporary outlets. 
Oleg Gubar, who has written extensively on Odessa’s markets, provides us 
with a noteworthy description of the original layout and use of the shops in 
the Greek Market.9 As he recounted, they were located in four distinct blocks 
of buildings, one on each side of the square formed by its perimeter, and were 
built between 1803 and 1810. A group of importers, primarily Greek, including 
Yanopoulos10 from Mytilene, Marazlis from Philipoupoli,11 Inglesis and 
Metaxas from the Ionian Islands, Papahadzis12 and Groza, owned grocery stores 
in the 4th block; Amvrosios,13 several shops in the 2nd block; and Paleologos, 
9 Author interview with Oleg Gubar in Odessa, June 2011. 
10 Anton I. Yanopoulos (1789 – c. 1850) was a Turkish subject and in 1830 he accepted 
Russian citizenship. In 1828 he was a third guild merchant.
11 Gregorios I. Marazlis (1770-1853) was a merchant of the first guild from 1816. He 
began his commercial career from Cherson. In 1803 he was established in Odessa and 
worked as a grain exporter. He was among the supporters and organizers of the free port. 
From 1818 to 1821 he served as a member of the commercial court. He was a founding 
member of the first insurance company, which supported Greek merchants and granted 
them credit. At the end of the 1830s he abandoned commercial affairs and in 1837 he was 
granted the title of Hereditary Honorary Citizen. He was married to Zoe Theodoridis, 
daughter of the merchant Theodore Theodoridis.
12 Kyriakos Papahadzis was a first guild merchant in 1814. DAOO, Fond 4, opis 1a, delo 229, 
List of merchants who declared their capital in 1814 (Spisok o kuptsakhobjavivshishkapitalyna, 
1814).
13 Ioannis (Ivan) A. Amvrosios (1770-1852) was a third guild merchant in 1799, second 
guild in 1800 onwards and first guild in 1804. He was at the head of Odessa’s duma (municipal 
administration), 1806-1809 and 1821-1824. He founded in 1814 the Greek Insurance Company 
with partners Ilias Manesis and S. Ksidas. In 1838 he was awarded the title of Hereditary 
Honorary Citizen.
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Map 1. Plan of the Bulvarnii quarter of Odessa indicating the Greek market and
its proximity to the port. 
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Velissarios, Manesis14 and Paterakis, shops in the 1st block.15 Interspersed 
among them were a few Russian merchants, Kamarev, Milovanov (Bulgarian), 
Kislov and Filogorov. According to the building plan of Francesco Frappoli,16 
each block consisted of 20 two-storey units with the shops and display areas 
on the ground floor and residences above. Most had an interior double-height 
court or atrium where foodstuffs could be stored temporarily in bulk or horses 
and carts could be parked (see plan 1). Commercial court records attest to the 
merchants’ demands for additional space. The resulting chaotic congestion of 
people, merchandise and incompatible activities was a hindrance to trade and 
increased the risk of fire, but had the unanticipated benefit of facilitating the 
secret meetings of the Greek clandestine organization, the Philiki Etaireia (the 
Society of Friends, described below), by making effective police surveillance 
nearly impossible.
Markets have been described as the location where supply and demand 
intersect.17 Yet, from the early Middle Ages on, their purpose was not exclusively 
economic. Markets were primary public spaces where sociability and state 
power were inextricably connected, the sites of public announcements, not to 
mention general police oversight.18 Permanent markets operated at the expense 
of traditional fairs, which, as Casson and Lee suggested, were established 
in order to bring high-value commodities to areas where consumerism was 
slow.19 As it happened in Odessa, with the addition of the New Bazaar, the 
proliferation of markets in the urban environment diminished the number 
and frequency of fairs.
14 Ilias A. Manesis was a second guild merchant (1815-1827) and became a first guild 
merchant during the decade 1827-1837. After 1837 he fell to the rank of third guild for two 
years and in 1839 he was inscribed again in the second guild. He died in 1843.
15 V. V. Morozan, Delovaya Zhizn na yuge Rossii v XIX-nachale XX veka, St Petersburg: 
D. Boulanin, 2014, pp. 449 ff.
16 Francesco Frappoli (1770-1817) was an architect from Naples whose projects were 
implemented during Richelieu’s governance in the central part of the city. He designed the 
Theatre Square, the Greek church of St Trinity at 55 Ekateriniska Street and the plan of 
the Greek market with its two-storey houses with columns on the ground floor; Valentin 
Piliavskii, Zodchie Odessi. Istoriko-arkitekturnie ocherki, Odessa: Optimum, 2010, pp. 17-18.
17 Mark Casson and John S. Lee, “The Origin and Development of Markets: A Business 
History Perspective”, Business History Review 85 (Spring 2011), pp. 9-37. 
18 James Masschaele, “The Public Space of the Marketplace in Medieval England”, 
Speculum 77/2 (April 2002), pp. 383-421.
19 Casson and Lee, “The Origin and Development of Markets”.
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Plan 1. Ground plan of Marazlis’ grocery store at 18 Krasni Pereulok, Odessa, 
marked with black ink. 1:200. 
Source: Technical Service for the registration of property, Municipality of Odessa. 
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Profile of the Merchant-entrepreneurs Involved in Foreign Trade 
and their Specializations
As a result of the trading policies of the Russian Empire in the first half of 
the nineteenth century, Russian merchants were restricted to domestic trade, 
while international trade was left mostly to foreigners who had access to 
commercial and maritime networks throughout the Mediterranean and on 
the Atlantic seaboard. The latter were distinguished by their ample resources 
and commercial know-how. Foreign merchants in Odessa could either 
opt for Russian citizenship and enrol in the graded domestic guild system 
based on the amount of their declared capital or maintain their original 
citizenship and enrol in the first guild, the only one open to foreigners. They 
were also ideally suited for satisfying the consumer demands of the foreign 
communities that had settled in Odessa and responded to the needs and 
customs of first-generation immigrants, who constituted an important part 
of the city’s population.
The import trade in the northern ports of Russia was dominated by the British 
and Germans and in the southern ones by Mediterraneans and the British once 
again.20 In contrast to Western laissez-faire, Russian trade was heavily controlled 
and patronized by the state.21 The first entrepreneurs to appear on the domestic 
scene were aristocrats who had acquired exclusive state-granted concessions 
for the production or trade of liquor, woollens and metals. From the point of 
view of the entrepreneur, Kirchner claimed that the monopolistic practices 
originating in the Russian government during the eighteenth century left little 
breathing room for merchants and restricted initiative. As a consequence, they 
were reluctant to take risks in Russia if not backed by state support.22 In contrast, 
Mediterranean merchants were in an advantageous position to engage in trade 
with Odessa due to geographical proximity, familiarity with the networks of 
Mediterranean foodstuff producers, and collaboration with the sea-faring 
20 Erik Amburger, “Der fremde Unternehmer in Russland bis zur Oktober Revolution 
im Jahre 1917”, Tradition. Zeitschrift für Firmengeschichte und Unternehmerbiographie 4 
(1957), pp. 337-355. For the import trade in the port of Taganrog, see Evrydiki Sifneos and 
Gelina Harlaftis, “Entrepreneurship at the Russian Frontier of International Trade: The Greek 
Merchant Community/Paroikia of Taganrog in the Sea of Azov, 1780s-1830s”, in Victor N. 
Zakharov, Gelina Harlaftis and Olga Katsiardi-Hering (eds), Merchant Colonies in the Early 
Modern Period, London: Pickering and Chatto, 2012, pp. 157-179; Victor N. Zakharov, 
“Foreign Merchant Communities in Eighteenth Century Russia”, in ibid., pp. 103-125.
21 William Blackwell, The Beginnings of Russian Industrialization, 1800-1860, Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1968, p. 25.
22 Kirchner, “Western Businessmen in Russia”.
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people of the region, usually from their own homeland, who could guarantee 
the safe transport of goods and often owned the very means of transportation. 
In the case of the Greeks, their familiarity with the procedures that regulated 
trade and maritime enterprises in the Ottoman Empire was very advantageous 
in dealing with similar regulations imposed by Russia, particularly in the 
early years.23 Knowledge of foreign languages and a sure grasp of institutional 
regulations (laws and duties, custom house rules and quarantine procedures), 
not to mention a long history of trading with the coastal towns of the Black 
and Azov seas before these territories were conquered by the Russians, gave the 
Greeks a prodigious edge over their competition.
Import trade in Odessa may be systematically categorized as follows:24
1.  Foodstuffs: fresh and dried fruits, olive oil 
2.  Products of colonial trade: coffee, sugar, tobacco, cigars, pepper, cinnamon, 
mastic, vanilla
3.  Fuel: coal, wood for burning
4.  Luxury goods: wines, champagne, porter, beers, pearls, coral, tortoiseshell, 
perfume, cork stoppers
5.  Construction materials: wood, lead, steel powder, oil for paint, bricks, 
tiles, stones 
6.  Housewares: crockery, porcelain, carpets, textiles, pottery, cutlery
7.  Plants and seeds.
British firms25 imported coal from Liverpool (Lander & Yeames) and 
Newcastle (E. Moberly & Co.), porter from Liverpool (Walther & Co.) and 
London (Fred. Cortazzi), colonial goods (coffee, sugar), potatoes and cheese 
(Lander & Yeames), manufactured products (cotton thread) from London, wood 
and carpets from the Persian trade (J. H. Atwood & Co.), beer, lead, steel in 
powder form and white iron (E. Moberly & Co.). French firms26 imported wines 
23 Gelina Harlaftis, “The Role of the Greeks in the Black Sea Trade, 1830-1900”, in L. R. 
Fischer and H. W. Nordvik (eds), Shipping and Trade, 1750-1950: Essays in International 
Maritime Economic History, Pontefract: Lofthouse, 1990, pp. 63-95; id., A History of Greek-
owned Shipping: The Making of an International Tramp Fleet, 1830 to the Present Day, 
London: Routledge, 1996; Vassilis Kardasis, Diaspora Merchants in the Black Sea: The 
Greeks in Southern Russia, 1775-1861, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001; Evrydiki Sifneos, 
“Merchant Enterprises and Strategies in the Sea of Azov Ports”, International Journal of 
Maritime History 22/ 1 (June 2010), pp. 259-268.
24 Journal d’Odessa, elaborated data from the weekly arrivals and departures of ships 
in Odessa’s port for the year 1824.
25 The categories of firms according to their ethnic origin are also elaborated from ibid.
26 Ibid.
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(Sicard & Co.), perfumes (Philibert & Co.), construction materials (Rey Revilliod 
& Cie), champagne (F. J. Raynaud, A. Collin and B. Langlois), olive oil and carob 
(Philibert & Co.), wine, cotton and roof tiles (Haggia Frères & Cie). All imported 
goods came from Marseille. The French had exclusive import rights for plants 
and seeds for Odessa‘s boulevards, public gardens and private summer houses 
by the sea. More acclimated to Odessa’s environment were plants originating in 
Constantinople, such as oleanders and laurels, which were particularly resistant 
to humidity and salt from the sea. Italian firms27 were either Neapolitan or 
enterprises from the North Italian ports of Genoa and Livorno. Sarato & Verani, 
the most prestigious firm of all, imported white wine from Marseille, household 
objects from Trieste, sardines and salted fish from Constantinople, fresh fruits 
and coffee from Chios, bottle corks from Liège, cheese and ordinary porcelain 
from Marseilles. Their mansion, built in the classical style between 1824 and 1826 
at 4 Primorskii Boulevard, still remains in the first row of houses overlooking 
the port. Pietro Sartorio Figlio imported coffee and sugar from Trieste, almonds 
from Livorno, olive oil from Genoa, and oranges from Messina; Niccolò Corsi 
brought rope, iron and copper from Sevastopol, flowers from Constantinople, 
beer from Trieste and red cotton thread from Marseille; Giovanni Almalli, 
tobacco and saffron from Constantinople, pearls from Marseilles, incense from 
Trieste, carob, Muscat wine and red raisins from Samos; Elia Trabotti, pepper, 
sugar and coffee from Trieste. 
Serbian firms,28 which by 1824 represented the second largest group of 
importers after the Greeks, carried commodities from Livorno and Trieste 
in Northern Italy mainly on Austrian brigs piloted by Ragusan [Dalmatian] 
captains. The free state of Ragusa (today’s Dubrovnik), whose strong seafaring 
tradition rivalled that of Venice, was annexed along with other Adriatic 
maritime republics to the Hapsburg Empire in 1813; it is not surprising 
therefore that the skills of Ragusan captains and crews were exploited by 
the Austrians to transport commodities from Trieste and other Italian ports 
to Odessa. The disruption of Mediterranean maritime trade during the 
Greek War of Independence (1821-1830) offered Dalmatian captains a prime 
opportunity to seize a share of the Greek seafaring business towards Russian 
coasts. Giovanni Risnich imported lemons, oranges, wine and olive oil from 
Messina and tobacco, cotton, coffee and raisins from Trieste; Giorgio Collich, 
oranges and bitter oranges from Messina, marble, alabaster, jams and pickles 
from Trieste and dates from Zante; Philippo Lucich focused on ordinary 
porcelain from Marseilles, slate and stone gravestones, toys, soaps, corks for 
wine bottles, salted fish and cheese from Holland and Switzerland.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
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Greeks29 imported fresh and dried fruits from the Archipelago and 
Constantinople, olive oil and tobacco. Dimitrios Dumas brought carob, olive 
oil, tobacco and lemon juice from Samos; Alexandros Mavros, coffee, olive oil 
and tobacco from Constantinople; Constantin Artinos, tobacco, Moldavian 
wine, and walnuts; Basil Yanopoulos, almonds, coffee and mastic from 
Chios, and incense and dates from Constantinople; Alexander Kumbaris, 
salted fish, dates and the various currencies of the Ottoman Empire from 
Constantinople; Gregorios Marazlis, coffee, halva and Ottoman currencies 
from Constantinople, wood from the Black Sea, and olives, jars, soap bars, 
olive oil, oranges and pomegranates from Genoa; Constantin Pappudov, 
dates, carob, incense, tobacco and red raisins from Constantinople and 
Syros; Rodocanachi Figli & Cie, sugar from London, white cotton thread 
from Constantinople, and coral from Livorno; Krionas Papa Nicola 
tobacco for his workshop, rose oil, raisins, almonds and empty barrels from 
Constantinople and Syros; Antonios Economos, Moldavian wine; Buba 
Frères, red cotton thread from Marseilles, and sponges, books and clothing 
from Constantinople; Grigorios Rossolimos, wine from Galatz.
Very popular as imports, corks de liège were indispensable for wine cellars 
and the bottling of beer, wines, liqueurs and beverages that arrived in barrels 
and were sold in bottles. Equally in demand were smoking accessories, long 
cherry-sticks from Tiflis for smoking à la turque and mouth-pieces made of 
amber and ornamented with enamel or gold. The traveller Moore described 
how, in most of the houses he visited, the water pipes were ranged against the 
wall, in the same way as cues are placed in billiard rooms. After dinner it was 
common to offer coffee, liqueurs and pipes. The wine shop at 32 Politseiska 
in the house of Matfei Petrovich Milovanov in the 4th block of the Greek 
Market was typical of its kind in the 1840s: it sold all sorts of wines together 
with paints, vegetables and playing cards, which were at the time a state 
monopoly.30
The Profile of the Merchant-sea Captain
There were many ways of penetrating Odessa’s market, but one of the most 
popular was that of the captain-merchant enterprise, most frequently seen 
among the Greeks, Slavs, Italians and the British. It was based on a close 
collaboration between captains and resident merchants, usually from the 
same place of origin. The enterprise would begin as a partnership between 
29 Ibid.
30 Oleg Gubar, “Dom na Politseiskoi”, Almanakh 20 (2005), pp. 66-75 (accessible online: 
http://www.odessitclub.org/publications/almanac/alm_20/alm_20_329-333.pdf, accessed 10 
April 2012).
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a merchant or supercargo and a captain who were willing to take risks in 
new markets and share profits. If the enterprise was successful and the gains 
stable, the cooperation would evolve by splitting the jointly held business into 
separate entities. The merchant would attempt to gain temporary resident 
status and, ultimately, the right to reside and do business in Odessa on a 
permanent basis. Having succeeded in this, he maintained his collaborations 
with the captains from his homeland. He would meet them at the port, inform 
them when new grain consignments were available, entrust them with the 
transport of his merchandise, commercial and personal correspondence, cash 
and bills of exchange. Ad hoc collaboration in the purchase and, ultimately, 
sale of grain at ports of their choice were permanent features of the merchant-
seafarer enterprise.31
Greek firms had a performance advantage over Russian and other foreign 
competitors. They possessed the know-how for organizing and establishing 
trade in territories that lacked infrastructure.32 Russia’s state paternalism, 
the blurring between the roles of state officials and monopoly holders, and 
merchant privileges and exemptions did not, as they did for their Western 
European competitors, present insurmountable obstacles to the penetration 
of the Russian market. This, and geographic proximity, constituted important 
advantages. The use of Constantinople as port of origin for business ventures in 
Russia’s southern ports and the early acquisition (long before their competitors) 
of the right to access the Black and Azov seas flying the Ottoman or Russian 
flag allowed them to gain a privileged position.33 The port records for arrivals 
and departures of Greek ships in Odessa in 1824, during the Greek War of 
Independence, highlights that most Greek captains, in order to enter the Black 
Sea, employed British ships from the Ionian Islands, which were under British 
protection, and made use of British or Russian flags as a flag of convenience, 
thereby assuring uninterrupted passage through the Straits into the Black Sea.34 
31 Harlaftis, A History of Greek-owned Shipping, Chap. 5, pp. 147-181. 
32 Evrydiki Sifneos, “Diaspora Entrepreneurship Revisited: Greek Merchants and 
Firms in the Southern Russian Ports”, Enterprises et Histoire 63 (juin 2011), pp. 40-52.
33 Ibid.
34 G. Harlaftis and K. Papakonstantinou (eds), Ναυτιλία των Ελλήνων, 1700-1821. Ο αιώ-
νας της ακμής πριν από την επανάσταση [Ηistory of Greek shipping, 1700-1821: The heyday 
before the Greek Revolution], Athens: Kedros and Ionian University, 2013, pp. 127-144, 145-
206; Panayiotis Kapetanakis, Η ποντοπόρος εμπορική ναυτιλία των Επτανήσων την εποχή 
της βρετανικής κατοχής και προστασίας και η κεφαλληνιακή υπεροχή (1809/15-1864). Στόλος 
και λιμάνια, εμπορεύματα και διαδρομές, ναυτότοποι και ναυτικοί, επιχειρηματικότητα και 
δίκτυα, κοινωνία και πλοιοκτητικές ελίτ [The Deep-sea going merchant fleet of the Ionian 
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Until the Crimean War, moreover, Greek businesses were import-export, 
a distinct and profitable advantage over Western European concerns, which 
exported exclusively. A small group of Chiot merchants (Ralli, Rodocanachi), 
who had settled in the city with sufficient capital and formed large-scale 
mercantile enterprises, shifted their business mainly to exports and invested in 
their own means of transport.35 Combining trade and shipping under one roof 
reduced transaction costs and was very competitive. Merchant ship-owners 
acquired two types of vessels, those of small capacity (barges) to transport 
grain from the river estuaries to Odessa and sailing ships of bigger tonnage 
for the open seas. As Eastern Orthodox Christians, Greek merchants also took 
advantage of religious affinity in acquiring grain from their co-religionists in 
the countryside during the first half of the nineteenth century. Also, and among 
other things, this allowed them to supply the vast Russian market with the non-
edible olive oil needed for lighting church lamps.36
The Greek Market and its Residential Surroundings
Grecheskaia Ulitsa (Greek Street) was the first parallel south of Odessa’s best-
known pedestrian street and a popular destination for ambling promenades, 
Deribasovskaia. The members of the Greek community of the city traditionally 
built their houses here, many of which can still be seen lining the sidewalks on 
both sides of the street. Grecheskaia Ulitsa terminated at the Greek Market, in 
the centre of which an unusual oval building was constructed in 1840. Named, 
not coincidentally, Afina (Athens), it continues to serve to this day as one of the 
city’s indoor markets and is, in effect, a prototype mall (see fig. 1). 
Islands during the British conquest and protection and Cephalonian prominence (1809/15-
1864): Fleets and ports, cargoes and sea routes, maritime centres and seamen, and networks, 
society and ship-owning élites], unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Ionian University, Corfu, 2010, 
pp. 66, 264-265. See also the newspaper Journal d’Odessa for the year 1824, with weekly 
reports of arrivals and departures of vessels.
35 Stanley Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the Industrial Revolution to 
World War I, Cambridge 1992, pp. 202-205; I. Pepelasis Minoglou, “The Greek Merchant 
House of the Russian Black Sea: A Nineteenth-century Example of a Trader’s Coalition”, 
International Journal of Maritime History X/1 (1998), pp. 61-104; Harlaftis, A History of 
Greek-owned Shipping, Chap. 2, pp. 38-70; id., “Mapping the Greek Maritime Diaspora 
from the Early Eighteenth to the Late Nineteenth Centuries”, in I. Baghdiantz McCabe, G. 
Harlaftis and I. Pepelasis Minoglou (eds), Diaspora Entrepreneurial Networks: Four Centuries 
of History, Oxford: Berg, 2005, pp. 147-169; Sifneos, “Diaspora Entrepreneurship Revisited”.
36 Evrydiki Sifneos, “Mobility, Risk and Adaptability of the Diaspora Merchants: The 
Case of the Sifneo Frères Family Firm in Taganrog (Russia), Istanbul and Piraeus, 1850-
1940”, The Historical Review / La Revue Historique VII (2010), pp. 239-252.
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Small two-storey houses in the Balkan style have been preserved on 
the side streets that intersect with Grecheskaia Ulitsa. On Krasni Pereulok 
(Red Lane or Cloth Lane) at numbers 16, 18 and 20, three of these have 
been combined to house today the Hellenic Foundation for Culture. The 
original interiors have been preserved in the middle of the three, which 
was the grocery store and residence of the merchant Gregorios Marazlis. 
Members of the Philiki Etaireia, the secret fraternity founded in 1814 by 
Greek merchants to promote the liberation of the Greeks from the Turkish 
dominion and to plan the Greek War of Independence of 1821, met here.37 
37 Theophilus C. Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, DeKalb: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 1994; George Frangos, “The Philiki Etaireia: A Premature National 
Coalition”, in Richard Clogg (ed.), The Struggle for Greek Independence: Essays to Mark the 
150th Anniversary of the Greek War of Independence, London: Macmillan, 1973, pp. 87-103; 
Grigori Arsh, Η Φιλική Εταιρία στη Ρωσία. Ο απελευθερωτικός αγώνας του ελληνικού λαού 
στις αρχές του 19ου αι. και οι ελληνορωσικές σχέσεις [The Society of Friends in Russia: The war 
for the liberation of the Greek people at the beginning of the nineteenth century and Greek–
Russian relations], Αthens: Papasotiriou, 2011; Ioannis K. Philimon, Δοκίμιον ἱστορικόν περὶ 
τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως [Historical essay on the Greek Revolution], 4 vols, Αthens 
1859-1861; Sakellarios Sakellariou, Φιλική Εταιρεία [The Society of Friends], Odessa 1909; I. 
A. Meletopoulos, Η Φιλική Εταιρεία. Αρχείον Π. Σέκερη [The Society of Friends: P. Sekeris 
archive], Αthens 1967.
Fig. 1. The entrance of the Afina mall, 
former oval building of the Greek 
market in Odessa.
Photo: Vassilis Colonas. 
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The historical building serves as a reminder of the importance of commerce 
as a conveyor of revolutionary ideas in the Greek immigrant community. 
Indeed, the merchants’ contacts among Russian administrative and military 
personnel and their broad business networks were crucial facilitators for the 
transportation of materials and exchange of information and ideas essential 
for successfully pursuing the cause of Greece’s independence.
In sum, I would argue that the rise of a consumer society went hand in 
hand with the penetration of new tastes, habits and ideas. In the 1820s Odessa 
was a city of great opportunity, an eastern El Dorado, the destination for 
adventurers and up-and-coming entrepreneurs. It was in this environment 
that Greek merchants, who were exposed by their frequent voyages to the ideas 
of the Greek enlightenment and to the suffering realities of their homeland 
under Ottoman domination, founded in the city the secret Philiki Etaireia. 
Imagining Greece’s Independence in Odessa’s Greek Market 
In the following part of my article, I attempt to read the Philiki Etaireia’s 
development and its influence on the Eastern Question and Russian-Ottoman 
relations in the light of the general political fermentation that was taking 
part in the Russian Empire, mainly through the creation of secret societies 
within the Russian army. I believe that the general mobility and movement 
of ideas influenced by the Western experiences of the Russian military who 
had been stationed in Europe during and after the Patriotic War of 1812 were 
major issues that left aside, at least at a regional level, movements of the same 
character that concerned the Greeks. 
In the microcosm of Odessa’s Greek market, political agitation was 
taking place, not among military officials who founded societies, but among 
merchants. The Philiki Etaireia was established by merchants of the Greek 
diaspora in 1814. It was the driving force and soul of the Greek Revolution, 
the prime source for the organizational structure and ideological framework 
of the war until it was disbanded in 1821. Out of a membership of 1093, 53.7% 
were merchants.38 Among its members were 113 merchants recruited in 
Odessa in the manner of the Carbonari and Freemasons (oaths, initiation 
rituals, lodges, secrecy).39 Odessa was one of the principal centres of support 
for Alexander Ypsilantis’ uprising in the Danubian Principalities in February 
38 Frangos, “The Philiki Etaireia”, pp. 87-103; Philimon published 692 members in Δοκίμιον 
ἱστορικόν, Vol. I, pp. 389-416; Sekeris listed 520 members in Μeletopoulos, Η Φιλική Εταιρεία, 
pp. 98-165; V. G. Mexas published 541 names in his Οι Φιλικοί [The Etairists], Athens 1937.
39 Frangos, “The Philiki Etaireia”.
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1821. Odessa sent money, arms and combatants to support the rebels in 
this region. The Society planned to launch simultaneous revolts in the 
Principalities, Constantinople and the Peloponnese. Ypsilantis was a high-
ranking officer of the Russian cavalry who had participated in the Napoleonic 
Wars and was injured in the Battle of Dresden, where he lost his right hand. 
Of Greek descent and an enthusiastic advocate of the Greek insurrection 
against the Turks, he accepted the leadership of the Society of Friends in the 
early months of 1820. This appointment was crucial for the Greek movement, 
in that it bolstered the myth of Russian support and placed at the head of 
the Society a military man of action and proven heroism and capabilities. 
Ypsilantis increased the organization’s prestige among Russian officers and 
his military colleagues. The Decembrists Lieutenant-Colonel Pavel Pestel, 
Major-General Mikhail G. Orlov and other officials expressed admiration 
for Ypsilantis’ cause.40 Pestel wrote to General P. D. Kiselev that Ypsilantis’ 
revolt was worthy of the highest respect,41 and the latter expressed himself in 
a letter to General A. A. Zakrevski on 1 March 1821 in the following manner: 
“Ypsilantis has left his name to posterity. Greeks reading his proclamation 
have rushed with joy to his banner. God help him in this sacred cause, and 
Russia too, I might add.”42 These officers’ parallel involvement in the Union 
of Welfare’s branches at Kishinev and Tulchin created a convenient climate 
for the Society of Friends’ own activities in Κishinev. Ypsilantis requested 
permission for a leave of absence from Russian service for health reasons and 
made his plans as the leader of the Philiki Etaireia. After visiting Moscow and 
Kiev he arrived in Odessa in August 1820. On the basis of his social standing 
he enjoyed the hospitality of a retired general, George Cantacuzinos, who 
later followed him in the Moldavian expedition, with the aim of meeting 
Greek merchants. The presence in Odessa of the leader of the Philiki Etaireia 
was the catalyst that unified old guard and new members and introduced the 
Society to the merchants of the city and military men from Greece, many 
of whom became members. Despite Ypsilantis’ successes and gaining some 
material support for his military plans,43 monetary donations failed to meet 
expectations. In September 1820 he left Odessa, where the atmosphere had 
become explosive, recruitment of volunteers increased daily, and rumours 
40 Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, pp. 49-50.
41 Patrick O’Meara, The Decembrist Pavel Pestel: Russia’s First Republican, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, p. 49, letter of P. Pestel to P. D. Kiselev, 3/15 March 1821.
42 Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, p. 42.
43 Sakellariou, Φιλική Εταιρεία, p. 66.
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regarding Greek organizational activity for Kishinev were rampant.44 On 22 
February Ypsilantis crossed the Pruth River into Moldavian territory and 
began mustering his forces.
Tsar Alexander I was informed about the Greek insurgency and Ypsilantis’ 
drive at the Leibach (now Ljubljana, Slovenia) Congress of the Holy Alliance. 
He immediately condemned the revolt and dismissed Ypsilantis from 
Russian service.45 Through the Russian consul in Iasi he severely questioned 
the motives of Odessa’s Governor-General Count de Langeron regarding his 
ongoing correspondence with Ypsilantis, in particular his receipt of Ypsilantis’ 
confidential letter of 26 February 1821 announcing the insurrection and 
requesting that de Langeron not raise obstacles to the movement of Greek troops 
in the direction of the Moldavian border.46 The governor-general was ordered to 
explain himself in regard to his issuing passports to individuals moving from or 
via Odessa to the Moldavian border in the months previous to March 1821.47 De 
Langeron replied to the foreign secretary that the individuals in question were 
merchants, most of them Ottoman subjects, who had asked to visit Moldavia 
for business reasons and that their intercepted letters referred exclusively to 
commercial affairs.48 After Ypsilantis’ revolt was quelled by Turkish troops 
at Dragasani in Bessarabia and refugees from both the Principalities and 
Constantinople fled to Odessa, Russia showed signs of shifting policy. Turkish 
reprisals and the assassination by order of the sultan of the Greek Patriarch 
Gregorios V in Constantinople on Easter Sunday 1821 had a powerful impact on 
Russian public opinion, which exerted pressure on imperial foreign policy. On 
17 July Russia delivered a strongly worded message to the Porte. The ultimatum, 
prepared by Ioannis Kapodistrias, reiterated Russia’s right to act as protector 
of its persecuted co-religionists and to evacuate refugees, and demanded that 
the sultan withdraw from the Principalities and restore damaged Orthodox 
44 Historical and Ethnological Society of Greece, Aρχείο Εμμανουήλ Ξάνθου [The 
Emmanuel Xanthos Archive], Vol. II, Athens 2000, letter of A. Ypsilantis from Odessa to 
Xanthos in Bucharest, no. 1820/85, 9 September 1820, p. 165. 
45 Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, pp. 27-28.
46 Arkhiv vneshnei politiki Rossiiskoi Imperii [Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian 
Empire; hereafter AVPRI], Moscow, Fond Kantseliariia 1821, opis 468, delo 5939, letter 
of Ypslantis to Langeron, 21 February 1821, # 25, annex # 3566, quoted from George F. 
Jewsbury, “The Greek Question: The View from Odessa, 1815-1822”, Cahiers du Monde 
Russe 40/4 (octobre-décembre 1999), pp. 751-762, here at p. 755.
47 AVPRI, Fond Kantseliariia, opis 468, delo 5940, letter 3301, Nesselrode to Langeron, 
14/26 April 1821.
48 AVPRI, Fond Kantseliariia, opis 468, delo 5939, letter 3566, Langeron to Nesselrode, 
24 April/6 May 1821 and 28 April/10 May 1821, letter 3574.
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churches. Upon receiving no answer from the Ottoman authorities by the 
stipulated deadline, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople broke relations 
with the Porte and left for Odessa on 27 July 1821.
History of the Philiki Etaireia
The Philiki Etaireia was conceived by second-rate Greek merchants, clerks 
at Greek commercial houses and traders who struggled to stay above water. 
Nikolaos Skoufas, a fervent and enthusiastic advocate of Greek liberation, 
was a craftsman from Kompoti (near Arta on mainland Greece). He began 
his career as a hat maker and was drawn to Odessa in 1813 by business 
opportunities. Emmanuel Xanthos, from the Aegean island of Patmos, had 
studied at the religious school there. He was involved in commercial ventures 
between Smyrna and Trieste and arrived in Odessa in 1810. In 1812 he was 
a partner in the purchase of a quantity of olive oil from the island of Lefkas 
(Ionian Sea), where he was initiated into a Masonic lodge. He returned to 
Odessa in the autumn of 1813. Athanasios Tsakalov, from Ioannina in Epirus, 
was a shipping agent and clerk. His father was a fur merchant in Moscow. He 
had been in Paris in 1813 and was a member of the Greek Language Hostel, 
an association aiming to promote enlightenment among Greeks. As Grigori 
Arsh described it, after the foundation of the Philiki Etaireia in June 1814 
its members set off in different directions.49 Skoufas and Tsakalov went to 
Moscow in the hope of persuading the wealthy Greek merchants there to 
join the cause, while Xanthos went to Constantinople, where he worked as 
a clerk for the Greek merchant Lemonis Paleologos. They corresponded by 
letters written in secret code. By 1816 Skoufas had returned to Odessa and 
was living in the residence of the merchant Athanasios Sekeris; both Sekeris 
and his clerk Panayiotis Anagnostopoulos were members of the Society. 
Between 1818 and 1820 the nexus of the Society’s activities gradually shifted 
to Constantinople, where many new members were recruited from the local 
Greek population and from those who passed through on their way to or 
from subjugated Greece.50
As part of an attempt to raise the Philiki Etaireia’s profile, it was agreed 
that a personality of much higher profile than those of its founders should 
49 G. L. Arsh and G. M. Piatigorski, “Ορισμένα ζητήματα της ιστορίας της Φιλικής 
Εταιρίας υπό το φως νέων στοιχείων των Σοβιετικών αρχείων” [On some issues concerning 
the history of the Philiki Etaireia in the light of new evidence from the Soviet Archives], in 
Arsh, Η Φιλική Εταιρεία στη Ρωσία, pp. 487-513.
50 Jewsbury, “The Greek Question”.
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be recruited to head the organization formally. With this goal in mind, 
Xanthos was sent to Moscow and St Petersburg in an attempt to convince the 
most prominent Greek of the Russian Empire, the foreign minister Count 
Kapodistrias, to accept the post. On his refusal, Xanthos contacted Ypsilantis, 
who eagerly accepted the offer and briefly energized the movement as 
described above. While Ypsilantis’ failed operation was a severe setback, his 
role as a galvanizing figure for the future of the ultimately successful struggle 
for Greek independence cannot be underestimated and as such a great deal 
of the credit must go to the Philiki Etaireia, the mercantile networks that 
supported it (with Odessa figuring prominently) and its humble founders. 
Following the defeat in Moldavia in June of 1821 and the refugee crisis 
that ensued, a new board of directors was elected and the name of the Society 
was changed from Society of Friends (Philiki Etaireia) to the Philanthropic 
Society. Top-ranked merchants from the Greek Market and the Free Bazaar 
were elected to head it, including Ioannis Amvrosios, Gregorios Marazlis, Ilias 
Manesis, Alexandros Mavros and Alexander Kumbaris.51 Despite a severe 
economic downturn during 1821, they donated important sums of money 
to support the new Society’s goals. They worked with Russian institutions 
and the Holy Synod in order to collect funds from sympathetic Russians and 
manage its distribution to needy refugee families. Seven thousand refugees 
had passed the Moldavian border by the end of April 1821 and totalled 40,000 
by September.52
In addition these merchants continued to support the Greek Revolution 
in the Peloponnese with munitions and foodstuffs. In December of 1821, 
however, a private message from Governor-General de Langeron, who, 
until then, had tacitly permitted the survival of the Society by approving its 
change of name, informed the members of the tsar’s desire to dissolve all 
secret societies and ordered them to obey Alexander’s ukase to this effect.53 
After the abolition of the Society in December 1821, its members worked for 
the Russian authorities in the refugee relief campaign. Dimitrios Inglesis, 
51 Sakellariou, Φιλική Εταιρεία, p. 23; Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, 
p. 68.
52 Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, p. 57.
53 DAOO, 18, 5, 16, no. 3662, letter of the town head of Odessa to the head of the commercial 
court implementing the tsar’s decision (1 Αugust 1822) to shut down all secret societies, as 
well as the masonic lodges, 20 September 1822. The Society was already informed from the 
end of 1821 about the governor’s will to shut it down. See the letter of the Society to P. 
Saravinos, K. Tsiropoulos and M. Magoulas in Taganrog announcing Langeron’s order to 
liquidate the Society, 26 December 1821. Quoted in Sakellariou, Φιλική Εταιρεία, p. 269-270. 
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head of the city council in 1820, was appointed treasurer of the Odessa Relief 
Committee and sent reports documenting donors, sums, types of assistance 
and allocation of aid twice a year to Minister of Internal Affairs and Public 
Education Alexander Golitsyn. While at the head of Odessa’s municipality, 
Inglesis had kept contact with the insurrectionists in Moldavia and as early 
as March 1821 had sent 20,000 kurus to Ypsilantis at the Foxani camp for 
assistance.54 His correspondence with Loukas Valsamakis, who had joined, 
together with a group of Cephalonians, Ypsilantis’ forces reveals that Inglesis 
had elaborated a plan for arming commercial vessels and turning them 
into battleships in order to patrol the Black Sea coast and prevent Turkish 
reinforcements by sea.55
The aspirations of the Philiki Etaireia for a broader Balkan uprising 
against Turkish domination were initially embraced by the Balkan merchants 
who resided in Odessa and the Principalities. Although originating from the 
Bulgarian, Serbian and Romanian territories of the Ottoman Empire, many 
were reported in the Russian archives as “Greeks” because the use of Greek 
as a common language in trade among the Orthodox Balkan merchants56 
confused Russian authorities. In the early years following the foundation of 
Odessa, Bulgarian and Serbian traders belonged to and were administrated 
by the “Greek magistracy”.57 Using the land trade routes through the Balkans 
and the frontier city of Nezhin, they relocated to Odessa when the new port 
established itself as an important trading outlet for the southern Russian 
region. Vasil Aprilov, the Palaouzov Brothers and Moustakov were among 
the most prominent.58 They shared common trading backgrounds with 
their Greek counterparts and the enlightened desire to promote education 
among their compatriots. Bulgarian and Greek merchants in the Balkans 
and Vienna not only financed the publication of books in Greek but also 
54 DAOO, 268.1.1., letter of thanks to Dimitrios Inglesis from Alexander Ypsilantis at 
Foxani, 11 March 1821.
55 DAOO, 268.1.1., letter of Loukas Valsamakis from Kishinev to Dimitrios Inglesis 
in Odessa on the issue of the fleet. In the same letter he announces that he will send him 
revolutionary pamphlets via their messenger, 5 March 1821.
56 Traian Stoianovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant”, The Journal of 
Economic History 20/2 (June 1960), pp. 234-313.
57 See the list of members of the Greek magistracy, 1799, DAOO, Fond 59, opis 1a, delo 156.
58 Oliver Schulz, “Port-cities, Diaspora Communities and Emerging Nationalism in the 
Ottoman Empire: Balkan Merchants in Odessa and their Network in the Early Nineteenth-
century”, in Adrian Jarvis and Robert Lee (eds), Trade, Migration and Urban Networks in 
Port Cities, c. 1640-1940, London: International Maritime Economic History Association, 
2008, pp. 127-148.
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contributed to their dissemination as subscribers.59 In Odessa, Balkan 
merchants donated money for the Greek Commercial Gymnasium, an 
institution for basic commercial education, whose classes were held mostly 
in Greek. Vasil Aprilov, Odessa’s most prominent Bulgarian merchant, 
who dealt in Moldavian wines,60 was a member of the Philiki Etaireia before 
1821. Aside from substantial financial contributions, he also offered the use 
of his shop, next to his vodka factory, to equip volunteers, many of whom 
were Bulgarian, preparing to join Ypsilantis’ forces.61 According to Nikolai 
Todorov, these were mostly refugees who had sought shelter in Bessarabian 
cities during the Russo-Turkish War of 1806-1812, Bulgarian soldiers who 
fought for the Russians in the same conflict or natives of Bulgarian territories 
of the Ottoman Empire. In July 1821, Russian officials counted 132 Bulgarians 
among the 1002 military survivors of the Ypsilantis insurrection gathered at 
a retention camp in Οrgiev.62
Ypsilantis’ revolt in Bessarabia failed to address effectively local social 
issues, specifically the agrarian population’s interests, and focused exclusively 
on the uprising of the Balkan people against Turkish rule. After its defeat 
and the banning of the Philiki Etaireia, the Bulgarian merchants emancipated 
themselves from what they had come to consider Greek tutelage and pursued 
their own national goals by promoting school funding and a Bulgarian 
literary renaissance.
Facilitating Factors for Political Fermentation
The activities of Russian and other secret societies in the 1820s and their 
propagation in the south of the empire were facilitated by a series of factors 
directly related to the size of the empire and the inability of the central 
government to control or supervise it efficiently. The administrative and 
military apparatus were both divided along regional lines that allowed relative 
autonomy in governance and decision-making. After the Patriotic War of 1812 
the army was reorganized into two territories, one based in Mogilev, Belarus, 
and the other in Tulchin, Podolia, from which army corps, divisions and 
59 Nadia Danova, “L’idée des ‘nôtres’ et des ‘autres’ dans les milieux de la diaspora 
bulgare au XIXe siècle”, Études Balkaniques XLVII/4 (2011), pp. 57-75.
60 The journal Odesski Vestnik reported Aprilov as an importer of Moldavian wines in 
1824; Odesski Vestnik, no. 103, 20 December 1824.
61 Νikolai Τοdorov, H βαλκανική διάσταση της Επανάστασης του ’21 [Balkan dimensions 
of the Revolution of ’21], Athens: Gutenberg, 1990, p. 112.
62 Ibid., pp. 191-294; DAOO, 1.249, 40, no. 3465, list of members of Ypsilantis’ defeated 
army retained at Orgiev, Kishinev, 14 July 1821.
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regiments received orders. The administration of territories distant from the 
capital proved to be very difficult. Moreover, after the creation of ministries 
in 1802, conflicts of authority emerged between the appointed regional 
representatives of the central government and the local governors-general.63 
Fragmentation and the creation of regional centres of power ensued and 
impeded faithful compliance to imperial guidelines. 
The specific factors that abetted the emergence of secret societies in the 
southern territories can be categorized as follows: 
Distance from the capital: The emergence of revolutionary activity was 
facilitated by the geographical distance of 2000 km, via Kiev and Moscow, 
between St Petersburg and Odessa. Regular mail required two to three months 
to be delivered, and consequently imperial orders, decrees and ukases were 
necessarily applied in retrospect. In the case of the Society of Friends and 
major clandestine societies operating in the south, the ukase that banned all 
conspiratorial organizations was delivered in August 1822, 18 months after 
the Greek uprising in Moldavia and 15 months after the Moscow congress of 
the Union of Salvation secret society.
Relative autonomy of the governors-general in local administration: After 
the 1812 War, governors-general were appointed in the provinces.64 They 
were imperial representatives at a regional level, responsible for both military 
security and civilian administration. The governor-general of Novorossiia 
(New Russia), Count de Langeron, was obliged to administer a vast territory; 
the paucity of means of transportation and the difficult climate obliged him 
to be absent from Odessa, the capital of the territory, frequently and for 
long periods of time. His predecessor, the Duc de Richelieu, required three 
months to travel through Crimea in order to compile an extensive report 
on the empire’s southern territories for the tsar. Moreover, the military and 
administrative duties of the governor-general were overwhelming and could 
not be attended to satisfactorily. This sense of ineffectiveness was amply 
conveyed in Count de Langeron’s “Réflexions sur la necessité de concentrer 
l’administration”, which he submitted in 1827 to the tsar; in it he proposed 
a division of Novorossiia whereby Odessa and Kherson would form one 
guberniia and Ekaterinoslav and the Crimea another.65
63 John P. LeDonne, “Administrative Regionalization in the Russian Empire, 1802-
1806”, Cahiers du Monde Russe 43/1 (janvier-mars 2002), pp. 5-34.
64 Id., “Russian Governors General, 1775-1825: Territorial or Functional Administration?”, 
Cahiers du Monde Russe 41/2 (janvier-mars 2001), pp. 5-30. 
65 LeDonne, “Administrative Regionalization”, p. 26.
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Relative facility of travel: In the 1820s movement from one place to another 
was hindered only for fiscal reasons. The imperial state wanted to ensure 
that its subjects would not leave their places of registration, temporarily or 
permanently, unless they had met their tax obligations and were debt-free.66 
Russian citizens required a guarantor in order to be issued a travel passport. 
They would apply to wealthy or first guild merchants who would guarantee 
the eventual payment of debts to the authorities.
Existence of major secret societies: The imperial authorities were primarily 
interested in detecting the existence of secret societies that included army 
officers, government bureaucrats and the nobility and to observe their 
members’ movements, the circulation of subversive texts and their expansion 
through recruitment. Alexander was primarily concerned with the existence of 
secret societies among “his” people, military and administrative personnel. The 
Greek secret society was a minor issue concerning mostly foreigners, primarily 
Ottoman or Greek subjects. It became an annoyance to the tsar from the moment 
it compromised Russia’s foreign policy, especially in relation to its partners in 
the Holy Alliance. Moreover, the tsar was concerned that the appearance of 
interfering in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire in support of rebels 
would destabilize his own government and provoke a ban on Russian shipping 
through the Straits. As declared in the ukase prohibiting secret societies,67 the 
tsar’s main concern was to assure that his military and administrative apparatus 
in the periphery was immune to subversive movements.
The repercussions against the Greek insurgents following the suppression 
of the Ypsilantis revolt made the Russian philhellenic movement stronger. We 
must not underestimate the importance of the attitude of particular individuals 
who held prominent government posts in the south and sympathized with the 
Greek cause. Among them were the governor-general of Novorossiia, Count de 
Langeron, the military vice-regent of Bessarabia, Ivan N. Inzov, Major-General 
Mikhail F. Orlov, the diplomats Alexandre Stourdza and Ioannis Kapodistrias, 
and army generals P. D. Kiselev, A. A. Zakrevski and A. P. Ermolov. Prousis 
identified them as members of a pro-war party that supported a Russian military 
intervention against the Porte and expected the tsar to approve it during the 
summer of 1821.68 In reality however, Russian foreign policy’s foremost priority 
was the bolstering of the established order, including the territorial integrity of 
66 Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime, New York: Macmillan, ²1992, p. 314.
67 DAOO, Fond 18, opis 5, delo 16. See note 53.
68 Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, p. 42.
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/02/2020 08:45:38 |
162 Evrydiki Sifneos 
the Ottoman Empire; aid and support for Russia’s Orthodox co-religionists in 
Greece was a secondary concern.
De Langeron, like many others in Russian service was a French aristocrat 
who had fled his country during its revolution. He maintained correspondence 
with the Duc de Richelieu after the latter returned to France to assume the 
post of prime minister (1815-1818 and 1820-1821). Before the Ypsilantis 
uprising, de Langeron maintained good relations with the Greek merchants 
of Odessa. They made his working plan to transform Odessa’s port into a 
gateway for the export of Russian grain to Europe possible, and he, therefore, 
facilitated their ventures and their access to the hinterland and other port-
cities. He often relied on their economic support and appointed merchants 
as heads of the city council. His relationship with Dimitrios Inglesis, a 
prominent Greek merchant, head of the council (1819-1820) and member of 
various municipal committees, reveals that they shared common views on the 
evolution of Odessa’s commerce and the measures to be taken to promote it. 
Inglesis, although not an official member of the Society of Friends until 1821 
supported the Ypsilantis revolt by covertly sending money and munitions, 
as the correspondence between them testifies (letter of 25 March 1821).69 De 
Langeron was equally positive regarding, and friendly with, Ypsilantis, who 
had gained respect among the Russian officer corps as the tsar’s military aide-
de-camp. The two men met when Ypsilantis visited Odessa in the summer 
of 1820 and engaged in discussions on topics of common interest and on 
Ypsilantis’ political thoughts on the Greek cause. His “benign neglect”, as it 
was qualified by Prousis, towards the movements of the Greek insurgents in 
Odessa and Bessarabia gave the Greek organization breathing room at a very 
critical moment in its history.70
Russian society’s acknowledged philhellenism and the general inclination 
of Russian policy in favour of the Orthodox Greeks, as formally delineated 
in the 1774 Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji, were in flagrant contrast with the 
repressive measures of the Holy Alliance. Jewsbury and Prousis have argued 
that de Langeron was unaware of the latest shifts in Russian foreign policy 
and continued to work in accordance with the policy of defending Russia’s 
Greek co-religionists. They also argued that the presence of Ypsilantis, the 
tsar’s former aide-de-camp, as head of the Society gave the impression that 
its ideas were supported by the upper echelons of Russia’s military and 
69 Theophilus C. Prousis, “Dimitrios S. Inglezes: Greek Merchant and City Leader of 
Odessa”, History Faculty Publications, Paper 6 (1991) (accessible online: http://digitalcommons.
unf.edu/ahis_facpub/6).
70 Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, p. 43.
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civilian administration.71 Ypsilantis’ letter to de Langeron insinuated that the 
tsar was aware of the uprising, underlined the secrecy of the communication 
and pleaded for the governor to facilitate Greeks wanting to join him without 
compromising Russia’s foreign policy.72 De Langeron, on his side, continued 
to issue passports for Bessarabia, allowing 300 individuals to cross the border 
between February and April 1821.73
It seems very probable that the tsar’s frequent and extended absences 
abroad in Europe, as well as his major role in European politics, were 
detrimental to keeping provincial governors up to date on Russia’s shifting 
foreign policy. Poor communication with the south impeded the quick 
receipt of diplomatic correspondence. News from Leibach, in today’s 
Slovenia, had to go via the Russian ambassador in Constantinople and then 
on a four- to six-day sea journey to Odessa. Strict quarantine measures on 
all passengers, regardless of rank, increased the travel time from Odessa 
to St Petersburg to more than 20 days. The Russian ambassador, Baron 
Gregori Stroganoff, left Constantinople on 27 July 1821 after the expiration of 
Alexander’s ultimatum to the sultan and arrived in Odessa on 2 August; he 
was released from quarantine 30 days later and departed for St Petersburg on 
1 September.74 Gaps in intelligence were apparent on all sides. De Langeron 
was not informed in a timely manner about the latest agreements among the 
members of the Holy Alliance and, inversely, the tsar was first made aware 
of the existence within his army of secret societies with political aims as late 
as 1821, several years after they were established.75 The practical hindrances 
in communication and de Langeron’s potentially flimsy excuse regarding the 
suspicious movement of foreign merchants towards the Moldavian border 
in 1821 convinced the authorities that he was innocent of the tsar’s well-
founded suspicion of complicity in Ypsilantis’ revolt. In fact, Tsar Nicholas 
I’s 1825 invitation to de Langeron to take part in the investigation of the 
Decembrist Uprising was a certain affirmation of his status as a loyal subject 
of the Russian Crown.76
71 Ibid., p. 44, and Jewsbury, “The Greek Question”.
72 Arsh, Η Φιλική Εταιρεία, p. 421. It quotes Ypsilantis’ letter to Count de Langeron of 
26 February/10 March 1821.
73 Todorov, H βαλκανική διάσταση της Επανάστασης του ’21, p. 115.
74 Jewsbury, “The Greek Question”.
75 Marie-Pierre Rey, Alexander I: The Tsar who Defeated Napoleon, DeKalb: Northern 
Illinois University Press, 2012, p. 143.
76 Jewsbury, “The Greek Question”.
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Another high-ranking military official who rendered indirect assistance 
to the Etairists was the military commander of Bessarabia, I. M. Inzov. Both 
he and his staff were aware of Greeks crossing the Bessarabian border and 
of the logistical preparations for the uprising in Kishinev. He maintained 
close ties with the officers of the southern Society, M. F. Orlov among them, 
who assisted Ypsilantis in finding housing and logistical support. He had 
previously approved the appointment of Greek merchants from Kishinev to 
key administrative posts responsible for access across the Pruth River border 
(quarantines, document control, etc.), thus creating a protective bubble of 
secrecy that enabled, for instance, the critical meeting at the quarantine in 
Izmail on 1 October 1820, a crucial gathering of a great number of the Society’s 
members, who came from Constantinople, the Peloponnese and elsewhere in 
mainland Greece and the Principalities, and which was devoted to deciding on 
the strategy for the insurgency.77
The Commercial Outlook of the Greek Society of Friends
Unlike other conspiratorial groups operating in the southern provinces, 
the Greek secret society had a fundamental advantage that camouflaged 
it and made detection of its activities nearly impossible. The overlapping 
of its operations with the methods of those of the everyday business of 
international trade, such as frequent correspondence within and beyond the 
borders, letters transported not by official post but by private means (ship 
crews or merchants), great mobility among the principals and agents of the 
commercial concerns, and the habitual transportation of money and letters 
of credit were alibis that seamlessly camouflaged the Society’s activities and 
structure. The matter, of course, of use of a foreign language provided yet 
another barrier to inspection and surveillance by local authorities. Reading 
and deciphering letters handwritten in Greek, mostly by uneducated people, 
required time and expertise. As Emmanuel Xanthos’ archive shows, most of 
the letters addressed to him from Odessa in the 1820s were signed simply with 
merchants’ initials, a very common practice for repetitive correspondence 
among people who knew each other but which also obscured the identity of 
the sender to the uninitiated. The letters provided news about “our commerce” 
in the Mediterranean foodstuffs that were popular in Russia, which was coded 
terminology for the progress of the Philiki Etaireia’s organization and affairs 
77 On the meeting, see I. K. Mazarakis-Ainian “H Φιλική Εταιρία. Γεγονότα του 1820” 
[The Society of Friends: The events of 1820], in Aρχείο Εμμανουήλ Ξάνθου, Vol. II, Athens 
2000, pp. xxi-xxiii.
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in general. The terms “our friend” or “friend” were part of the merchants’ 
vocabulary whenever they did not want to name clients, partners, creditors 
or a major merchant, often of a different ethnicity. The same terms were 
used to designate comrades and members of the Society. “He did not want to 
appear as our friend but they exposed themselves,” wrote Stamatis Kumbaris 
to Emmanuel Xanthos, criticizing the behaviour of two Odessa merchants 
who had recently become members of the Etaireia.78
The encrypted messages used by the Society often referred to “our 
commerce” for “our Society”, to “receive money in advance” or “down 
payment for our olive oil” for initiation into the Society, and to “receive money 
for our purchases” for member contributions. “Our trade [which meant our 
Society] has been revealed to everybody,”79 Kumbaris warned Xanthos in the 
autumn of 1820. “In regard to our trade, it has been divulged and everybody 
knows about our partnership, we suffer from not being silent […] notify the 
Good One that our goals are known here”, deciphered as “our secret society 
and its members have been discovered […] Ypsilantis must be warned that 
our purpose is known.” In September 1820, Ypsilantis also wrote to Xanthos, 
“I am leaving for Kishinev. After six days they have started to talk a lot and it is 
no good, speed is necessary.”80 “Send me the passport as quickly as possible,”81 
urged Dimitrios Themelis to Xanthos (in order to be able to join Ypsilantis at 
any time). The issuance of passports was crucial for their travel in and out of 
Russia and for the propagation of the Philiki Etaireia’s message under pretext 
of settling business debts. It has been pointed out that prominent merchants 
were unwilling to participate in subversive organizations.82 Yet, a closer look 
at surnames and their relation to mercantile houses reveals a more complex 
pattern of involvement. Merchants who worked overtly for the Philiki Etaireia 
were not businessmen of the highest rank but, typically, their clerks or minor 
partners. Emmanuel Xanthos was employed at the trading company of 
78 Aρχείο Εμμανουήλ Ξάνθου, Vol. I, letter of Stamatis Kumbaris from Odessa to 
Xanthos at Renni, no. 1819/25, 29 May 1819, p. 79.
79 Ibid., Vol. II, letter of Stamatis Kumbaris from Odessa to Xanthos in Kishinev, no. 
1820/119, 17 November 1820, p. 220.
80 Ibid., Vol. II, letter of A. Ypsilantis from Odessa to Xanthos in Bucharest, no. 
1820/85, 9 September 1820, p. 165.
81 Ibid., Vol. II, letter of Dimitrios Themelis from Galatz, no. 1820/103, 21 October 
1820, pp. 192-193. 
82 Prousis, Russian Society and the Greek Revolution, pp. 19-20. On the reluctant 
attitude of the wealthy Greek merchants of Moscow towards the Etairist members, see 
Arsh, Η Φιλική Εταιρία, p. 241; Jewsbury, “The Greek Question”.
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Vassilios Xenis, a merchant featured in the 1813 list of members of the first 
guild of the city who had paid their taxes to the municipality, according to the 
quantity of grain they had exported.83 Panagiotis Anagnostopoulos, another 
prominent member of the Society, was an employee of Athanasios Sekeris. 
Nikolaos Spiliadis (1785-1867), secretary of the Greek State in 1829 and under 
the authority of Ioannis Kapodistrias, worked as a clerk in the Mavros and 
Paleologos trading firms in both Odessa and Constantinople: the clerk and his 
bosses all became members of the Philiki Etaireia.84 In fact, several Greek family 
firms with branches in Odessa and Constantinople were involved in the secret 
society. The Kumbaris, Sekeris, Mavros and Paleologos firms constituted the 
principal commercial nodes of the Greek secret society in both cities. Of such 
firms, those with three partners were preferred for recruitment, since usually a 
third brother, less involved in the company’s business, could be counted on to 
devote himself to the Philiki Etaireia while providing access to the family firm’s 
assets and networks. This is evident in the case of the brothers Kumbaris and 
Sekeris. Stamatis Kumbaris, who was the key person in the Philiki Etaireia’s 
Odessa branch in the 1820s introduced Ypsilantis to important merchants 
such as Alexander Mavros, Alexander Kumbaris, Gregorios Marazlis, and 
Theodore Serafinos when the former visited Odessa in the 1820s. As Sakellarios 
Sakellariou recounted, these magnates were personally invited to dinner with 
Ypsilantis at a houtor (a farm with a villa) on the outskirts of the city and were 
informed about the existence of the Society and its leader. Under the cover of 
the prominent Kumbaris firm, Stamatis Kumbaris was able to exchange a 500 
pound sterling bank note sent to him by Ypsilantis for the purchase of the first 
shipment of munitions.85 The Company of Greek Insurers donated a sum of 
2500 roubles to Ypsilantis. 
However, business was slow in 1819-1820, and the merchants were financially 
strapped. As Chart 1 shows, the grain exported by ships from Odessa’s port 
had dropped after 1817 and would continue to shrink until 1822. 
83 DAOO, Fond 4, opis 1a, delo 204, list of first guild merchants compiled by the town 
magistrate, 11 June 1813.
84 See his contribution to the literature on the Revolution and the Greek War of 
Independance, Nikolaos Spiliadis, Απομνημονεύματα, ήτοι Ιστορία της Επαναστάσεως των 
Ελλήνων [Reminiscences, or History of the Revolution of the Greeks], ed. Panayiotis F. 
Hristopoulos, 3 vols, Athens 1851-1857. 
85 The money was changed and resent by a personal agent from Kumbaris to Xanthos 
at Kishinev; Aρχείο Εμμανουήλ Ξάνθου, Vol. II, G. D. Stamatis Kumbaris from Odessa to 
Xanthos in Kishinev, 10 August 1820, p. 147.
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Chart 1
Source: Elaborated data from P. Kapetanakis’ unpublished postdoctoral research, “The British and 
their Ionian Subjects in the Port-cities and Grain Markets of the Black Sea and the Danube: 
Penetration, Settlement, Integration (Late Eighteenth to Mid-nineteenth Centuries)”, 2012-2015. 
The year 1820, which was a crucial year for collecting money for the Philiki 
Etaireia in order to prepare the Ypsilantis insurgence and for buying munitions, 
was a bad year for trade during which exports fell from 128,166 to 111,902 tons 
of grain exported.86 Moreover, a comparison of the total turnover of renowned 
merchants in 1817 and 1821, both those involved in the Greek insurgency 
and those just making use of the maritime lane of the Mediterranean and the 
Aegean Sea, demonstrated a reduction in their commercial affairs. Indicatively, 
Dimitrios Dumas lost 46.5% of the value of his import-export transactions, while 
the wealthy merchants Dimitrios Inglesis, Grigorios Marazlis, Vassilios Xenis, 
Athanasios Sekeris and Lemonis Paleologos did not appear on the merchants’ 
list of 1821.87 Αntonios Tsounis wrote to Xanthos that he was unable to send 
money, “because the losses I have suffered from our wheat have drained any 
86 Ibid.
87 Gosydarstvennaia vneshniaia torgovlia 1817 goda, v raznykh ee vidakh, St Petersburg 
1818, table XI, pp. 118-123; Gosydarstvennaia vneshniaia torgovlia 1821 goda, v raznykh ee 
vidakh, St Petersburg 1822, table XI, pp. 122-129. 
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intention. I hope that in a short period of time I will participate in a new venture 
and then I will undertake to meet any of our trading friends.”88
Entrepreneurs knew that the grain trade could not yield profits in 
recession years and that the only source that could do so was tax farming of 
the liquor trade. Therefore, it was recommended that members of the Philiki 
Etaireia in Bessarabia should devote themselves to it. Another scheme for 
raising funds was an elaborate proposal of the Moscow merchants Antonios 
Komitzopoulos and Nikolaos Patzimadis involving the establishment of a 
public corporation by the name of Φιλόμουσος και Φιλάνθρωπος Γραικική 
Εμπορική Εταιρεία [Greek Commercial Society of Friends of the Muses and 
People], whose shareholders would be Russian and foreign philhellenes. 
The official activities of the company would include ship-building, printing 
presses, book publishing and the foundation of schools, while its covert 
objective would be the raising of funds for the liberation of the nation.89
In the last months of 1820 and the beginning of 1821 a great number of 
Greek merchants in Odessa became members of the Etaireia.90 All of them were 
prominent first and second guild merchants. G. M. Piatigorsky, who wrote the 
biographies of 16 of them, estimated that approximately 20% of Odessa’s male 
Greek population were members of the Etaireia.91 Among them we may discern 
powerful merchants of the grain trade and Odessa’s import-export businesses 
(Theodore Rodocanachis, Constantin F. Papudov, Alexandros Mavros, Gregorios 
Marazlis, Theodore Serafinos, Ilias Manesis, Ioannis Amvrosios, Dimitrios 
Inglesis, M. N. Petrokokkinos, Krionas Papa Nicola, Mattheos Mavrocordatos, 
Ioannis Skaramangas). Governor-General de Langeron, in a reply to Nesselrode 
on 14 May 1821, named the leaders of the Society and indicated that Ioannis 
Amvrosios was at the head of the Odessa branch.92
Following Ypsilantis’ defeat and imprisonment and the resulting change 
of the Philiki Etaireia’s focus from revolution to philanthropic support 
of Greek refugees (combatants and non-combatants alike) fleeing the 
Principalities to Odessa, big name merchants became more openly involved. 
88 Aρχείο Εμμανουήλ Ξάνθου, Vol. I, letter of A. Tsounis from Odessa to Xanthos to 
Kishinev, 19 July 1819, p. 103.
89 Philimon, Δοκίμιον ιστορικόν, Vol. I, Chap. 1, pp. 27-28.
90 Sakellariou, Φιλική Εταιρεία, p. 70.
91 G. M. Piatigorsky, “De l’histoire de l’activité de la Philiki Etéria à Odessa dans les années 
1814-1821. Les données récentes des archives soviétiques sur les biographies des Éteristes 
d’Odessa”, in Troisième Colloque. Les rélations entre les peuples de l’URSS et les Grecs, fin du 
siècle XVIII, début du XXe siècle, Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, 1992, p. 138.
92 Ibid., pp. 115-137.
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They devoted themselves to this task, cooperated with Russian authorities, 
and supported the work of various committees. As mentioned previously, 
they also expedited the issuing of passports by providing guarantees for 
their agents and revolutionaries who required access to insurrection-torn 
territories. The merchant Vayanos Paleologos, a member of the board of the 
Society in 1821, helped Ottoman and Greek subjects in obtaining passports 
for the Russian interior and Constantinople.93 It seems that the Society’s most 
active members on Russian soil were Ottoman subjects who could move 
more freely and were not impeded by oaths of allegiance to the tsar. The fine 
balance between multiple loyalties, Russian homeland, Ottoman citizenship 
and Greek revolutionary aspirations required “craft and mimicry” and was a 
salient characteristic of pre-national identity. 
Gregorios I. Marazlis, the father of Odessa’s municipal leader Gregorios G. 
Marazlis, headed the Odessa branch of the Society in its second, “philanthropic”, 
phase (June 1821- December 1821). His bustling establishment at Krasni Pereulok 
was a centre for the Society’s activities, which were camouflaged by the busy 
coming and going of carts and loading and unloading of merchandise. Clients 
could find olive oil and olives, mastic and carob, halva, oranges, pomegranates, 
coffee, and wood for fireplaces. Suppliers from the port and various others 
dallied on the upper floor, drank tea, smoked in the Turkish style and discussed 
the Society’s relief aid to Greek refugees. The central role of hospitality in the 
Society’s philanthropic work is illustrated by Sakellariou when he pointed 
out that in October 1821 Marazlis hosted the Orthodox clergyman Gregorios, 
Metropolitan of Eirinoupoleos and Vatopedi, “as usual”. During the course of 
the visit, Gregorios was selected to represent the Society in the Russian capital 
in an effort to collect donations for its philanthropic aims.94
Anatole Mazour characterized the Decembrist Uprising of 1825 as the 
first Russian Revolution.95 The political liberalism that pressed for limits 
on absolute power in Russia and throughout Europe and the uprisings for 
national self-determination in the Balkans challenged the legitimacy and 
territorial integrity of the established states that the Holy Alliance struggled 
93 Paleologos participated in the meeting of the Society’s board at Marazlis’ shop on 
3 October 1821, together with Ilias Manesis, Ioannis Amvrosios, Kyriakos Kumbaris and 
Mikhail Nastos. See Sakellariou, Φιλική Εταιρεία, p. 16. In March 1824 Paleologos was 
reported by the Russian police as a warrantor for the issuing of passports of 15 Ottoman 
and Greek subjects who asked permission to travel to Constantinople, Moldavia, Nikolaiev 
and the Crimea. See Journal d’Odessa 27-33 (March 1824).
94 Sakellariou, Φιλική Εταιρεία, pp. 25-27.
95 Anatole Mazour, The First Russian Revolution, 1825, Berkeley 1937.
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to maintain. The broader picture of the interconnected uprisings in the 
Balkans of the 1820s stresses the significance of merchants not only as agents 
of economic integration and development of backward areas, but as channels 
for an intellectual renaissance that fermented enlightened principals and 
encouraged political liberalism and reform. The isolation of the southern 
provinces from the imperial centre, poor means of communication and 
transportation, and the dispersion on many fronts of several conspiratorial 
societies created an ideal environment for the Philiki Etaireia’s expansion 
and organization. Time proved to be on the Greek revolutionaries’ side. 
The philhellenic disposition of Russian society and the Society’s links with 
the pro-war party in Russian diplomatic and military circles enabled the 
successful relief campaign for the first victims of the uprising and added 
pressure for a new direction in Russo-Ottoman relations that favoured the 
Greek insurgents in the years from 1822 to 1829 and led to the decisive defeat 
of the Turkish fleet by the three Great Powers at the naval battle of Navarino 
on 20 October 1827. 
To summarize, the development of the import trade in the years from 1810 
to 1830 and the decisive role of the Greeks as importers of basic Mediterranean 
foodstuffs shaped the tastes of the Odessa population and created a market 
for imported consumer goods for everyday use. As a locus of exchange and 
sociability, the Greek Market served simultaneously as a refuge of revolutionary 
aspirations and activity. The Greek merchants, owners of shops, embraced 
these ideas vis-à-vis the fate of their subordinated homeland. Their official 
commercial outlook masked their clandestine organizational movements, 
while the tolerance/indifference of the local authorities, and the parallel actions 
of major secret societies in the region’s army, spared attention from being paid 
to the movements of the Greek merchant-revolutionaries in Odessa.
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